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Only a couple of decades ago a large fraction of private insurance plans
paid for care on a fee-for-service basis, with any incentives for limiting ex-
penditures provided through typically small co-payments and deductibles.
The rising cost of medical care encouraged a progression to managed care
plans and today a large proportion of plan participants are enrolled in
plans that to some extent limit cost through supply-side restrictions on
the care that is provided. For a few years, it appeared as though the intro-
duction of managed care arrangements was indeed reducing the rate of in-
crease in the cost of medical care. There is substantial anecdotal evidence,
however, that the ability of managed care plans to limit cost increases may
be coming to an end. Patients’ rights legislation and the move to “turn de-
cisions back to doctors,” for example, suggest that strict supply limits on
care are increasingly coming under attack. The eﬃcient provision of med-
ical care remains a critical economic concern.
In this paper, we return to consideration of demand-side plan provisions
that may help to control cost and to provide care more eﬃciently. The plan
we consider is the medical saving account (MSA). MSAs have recently re-
ceived considerable policy attention as an alternative approach to improv-
ing the eﬃciency of individual spending decisions for health care. The 1996
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Matthew J. Eichner, Mark B. McClellan, 
and David A. Wise“Kennedy-Kassebaum” Health Insurance Portability and Availability Act
(HIPAA) includes speciﬁc tax incentives to support the use of MSAs on a
limited basis beginning in 1997.1The inclusion of MSAs in the HIPAA per-
haps reﬂects the recent consideration by economists and legislators of tax
reforms to encourage “demand-side” incentives to reduce medical expen-
ditures. The MSA relies on catastrophic health insurance—which, since
Arrow (1963), has been thought to be the most eﬃcient way to provide
health insurance—in conjunction with a saving plan dedicated to medical
expenditures.
Notwithstanding the eﬃciency beneﬁts of catastrophic health insur-
ance, the practical use of such plans has been limited by the low saving rate
of most Americans. Even rather small unexpected medical costs could be
greater than the liquid saving of a large fraction of American families.
Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1998), for example, ﬁnd that even the median
level of liquid ﬁnancial assets of American families with heads aged ﬁfty-
ﬁve to sixty-four is only about $3,000.2 The median for all families is much
smaller. Eichner and Wise (1999) show that the median of family liquid as-
sets is a paltry $1,900. For families with heads under forty-ﬁve, the median
is much smaller, and it is only $300 for families with heads under twenty-
ﬁve. Large ﬁrms are more likely than small ﬁrms to oﬀer medical insur-
ance. Among single people and families in which either spouse works in a
ﬁrm with over 500 employees, the median is $1,800. Among families in
which either spouse is covered by an employer- or union-provided health
insurance plan, the median is somewhat higher, but still only $2,700. Even
if other ﬁnancial assets are counted, it is clear that a large fraction of
families have saved very little. Thus it is evident that a large proportion of
households, having chosen not to save, have also virtually assured that they
will be “risk averse” with respect to unanticipated expenditures and—per-
haps ironically—willing to pay for generous health insurance. Indeed, too
much health insurance may be a companion to too little saving. A person
who doesn’t save may also ﬁnd himself spending too much for health in-
surance to cover the risky situation in which no saving has placed him.
The fact that a very large fraction of families has almost no liquid sav-
ings and would ﬁnd it hard to make even small out-of-pocket payments for
medical care presents a practical argument against catastrophic insurance.
An MSA is a way to address this concern. An MSA is, in our conception,
a combination of a catastrophic health insurance plan with a signiﬁcant
deductible established in conjunction with a medical saving account. By
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1. House resolution 3103 in the 104th Congress, which was renamed the Health Insurance
Portability and Availability Act, was signed by President Clinton in August 1996.
2. Based on 1991 Surveys of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) data and excluding
individual retirement account (IRA), 401(k), and any other personal retirement plans. Sur-
vey of Consumer Financedata, tabulated for us by Andrew Samwick, show higher but still very
low medians.providing a saving account that could be used to pay for substantial med-
ical costs, without causing major short-term disruptions in family budgets,
the MSA is intended to make insurance plans with high deductibles and
copayments practical for a larger number of Americans. The typical plan
would allow tax-free contributions to an MSA. At retirement, the MSA
balance could be used for support in retirement, with taxes paid upon with-
drawal of funds.
Low saving rates, however, may not be the only reason for the limited
market for catastrophic health insurance. The current tax treatment of
health insurance favors low-deductible plans. Employer-provided health
insurance is ﬁnanced with pretax dollars, so that individuals are likely to
choose more coverage than they would if they faced the full price of insur-
ance. Moreover, because out-of-pocket payments for medical care are only
deductible if they exceed 7.5 percent of income, tax law favors plans that
minimize out-of-pocket payments. Favorable federal tax treatment of
MSAs would tend to counteract these obstacles to the purchase of health
insurance with substantial out-of-pocket payments.3
Because a larger share of their actual medical expenditures would be ﬁ-
nanced from their own savings, individuals covered by an MSA would be
more sensitive to costs of treatment over a broader range of expenditures.
An MSA thus combines the desirable features of catastrophic coverage for
reducing medical expenditures with a mechanism that creates a reserve for
paying individual expenses. Thus an MSA coupled with a catastrophic in-
surance plan may reduce medical expenditures and encourage saving. To
the extent that catastrophic insurance costs less than more generous plans,
the MSA will also induce lower insurance costs.
Still, there remain important impediments to the feasibility of such
plans. Perhaps the most important of these is the extent to which individ-
ual medical expenditures persist for long periods of time. A person who in-
curs high expenditures every year over a lifetime would essentially be self-
insured and would accumulate no assets in the medical saving account. On
the other hand, a person who is never sick would have a tax-free saving ac-
count.
In an earlier paper (Eichner, McClellan, and Wise 1998) we considered
the persistence of the medical expenditures of members of a large Fortune
500 ﬁrm health insurance plan. We concluded that persistence in expendi-
tures seemed not to pose an overriding impediment to the implementation
of an MSA. In another paper (Eichner, McClellan, and Wise 1997), we dis-
cussed the attributes of such plans in a larger context, again focusing on the
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3. At least thirteen states have already enacted tax breaks for MSAs, but these reforms have
involved much lower state marginal tax rates. Existing federal law also allows employers to es-
tablish “ﬂexible spending accounts,” which permit employees to use pretax dollars for out-of-
pocket medical expenditures. However, balances not spent at the end of the year are lost, so
that employees tend to rely on them in a limited way for predictable expenses only.crucial equity consideration: the extent to which the feasibility of MSAs is
limited by the persistence of medical expenditures over an individual’s
working life. The broad implications of such tax incentives for insurance
and health care purchasing decisions are also reviewed in this paper, and
we discuss the key behavioral issues that are important in evaluating such
plans. In particular, the analysis illustrates how the MSAs envisioned in the
Kennedy-Kassebaum legislation would work in practice, describing the
important features of MSA tax incentives and considering how these in-
centives might aﬀect individual behavior.
We continue the analysis of MSAs in this paper, focusing again on the
implications of persistence in individual expenditures. Two important im-
provements in recently available data prompt us to revisit this question:
One is that we now have access to a six-year panel of individual medical ex-
penditures in a large ﬁrm, whereas the prior analysis was based only on a
three-year panel. The persistence in expenditures can be much more accu-
rately gauged with the six-year panel. The second reason is that the new
data allow more accurate identiﬁcation of plan enrollees who do not use
care in a given year. In our prior work we were in some instances unable to
distinguish persons who left the ﬁrm from those who simply had no med-
ical expenditures in a year. With the current data, we can identify all per-
sons covered by the plan, even if they have no medical expenditure in a
given year. In addition, in this paper we give more careful attention to the
potentially important saving eﬀects of MSAs. In particular, we consider
the accumulation in the MSA account, based on how the funds are in-
vested.
In the next section we describe the Fortune 500 ﬁrm data used in this
analysis. In section 6.3, we present summary data on the persistence in ex-
penditures and on the proportion of plan members who have high expen-
ditures in successive years. In section 6.4, we describe the method that we
use to project the lifetime expenditures of plan members under an MSA.
The goal is to approximate the distribution of medical expenditures over a
working lifetime in a large ﬁrm. We estimate a model that captures the pat-
tern of expenditures among employees and then use the model to simulate
the lifetime distribution of expenditures. Particular attention is given to
two issues: One is the extent of persistence, the expected expenditure in one
year conditional on expenditure in prior years. The second is the “unex-
plained” residual variance, or “shock” in expenditures, conditional on ex-
penditure in prior years. An important aspect of the data is that this unex-
plained variance is very large and, much more than persistence, determines
the lifetime distributions of expenditures. Moreover, these shocks are not
approximated well by any analytic distribution. Thus our simulation pro-
cedure depends heavily on nonparametric analysis based on the empirical
distribution of conditional expenditures.
The key results are in the form of simulations based on the estimated
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would approach retirement with a substantial proportion of MSA contri-
butions remaining in the account. Only a small fraction would approach
retirement with very small balances. Based on our illustrative plan, if in-
vestment of MSA assets were in equities, more than 50 percent of employ-
ees would have MSA balances greater than 300 percent of lifetime contri-
butions to the MSA. Only about 10 percent of men would retain less than
200 percent of contributions and only about 10 percent of women would
retain less than 125 percent of contributions. If investment were in bonds,
balances would be much lower. In this case about 10 percent of both men
and women would retain less than 50 percent of contributions. Thus we be-
lieve that persistence of medical expenditures does not present an overrid-
ing obstacle to the adaption of MSA plans.
6.2 The Data
The data are medical claims of employees in a large Fortune 500 manu-
facturing ﬁrm. The analysis is based on all fee-for-service insurance claims
over the six-year period 1990 through 1995. Over this period approxi-
mately 500,000 employees and their dependents were covered through
these insurance plans. All reported inpatient and outpatient medical ex-
penditures for this population are included in our analysis.4
The ﬁrm has two fee-for-service plans, one for hourly and another for
salaried employees. The hourly plan, with beneﬁts negotiated in union con-
tracts, provides “ﬁrst-dollar” coverage for virtually all health care. Because
of this virtually unlimited coverage, hourly employees have no ﬁnancial in-
centives to join managed-care or health maintenance organization (HMO)
plans, although speciﬁc provider relationships and location considerations
may provide some nonﬁnancial incentives. The salaried plan has an annual
deductible of $200 per individual and $250 per family, a 20 percent coin-
surance rate for all expenses, and an out-of-pocket annual limit (including
the deductible) of $500 per family. Routine physical examinations are
not covered. Both plans incorporate limited case management for certain
high-cost medical conditions and concurrent review of hospital stays. The
hourly plan includes preadmission certiﬁcation requirements for certain
elective admissions; patients who elect admission despite precertiﬁcation
denial are responsible for 20 percent copayments up to $750 per individual
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4. We do not include dental services, vision care, or outpatient pharmaceuticals, which ac-
count for approximately 15 percent of medical expenditures. Because these expenditures are
relatively less concentrated in particular individuals than other inpatient and outpatient ser-
vices, incorporating them would be unlikely to lead to a more concentrated distribution of
medical expenditures in this population. Indeed, to the extent that such expenditures are not
covered by traditional plans, their eligibility for MSA coverage would reduce individuals’ net
out-of-pocket medical expenses.and $1,500 per family. Both plans also require second opinions for sixteen
elective surgical procedures, although the procedures are covered regard-
less of the second-opinion ﬁnding. Both plans have very generous hospital
stay limits: 365 days per stay, renewable after 60 days out of the hospital.
As emphasized in the introduction, there are two important features of
the new data used in this analysis: One is the longer panel, and the other is
the “enrollment” data that allow us to track employees who are plan mem-
bers but have no medical expenditures in a given year. The enrollment data
are available, however, only for the last three years of the panel. For the ﬁrst
three years, we must estimate whether a person who has zero expenditure
is still enrolled in the plan. We do this by using the relationship between en-
rollment on the one hand and personal expenditure and other attributes on
the other hand, based on the last three years of the panel. In this way, we
create a synthetic data ﬁle that contains reported expenditures of all en-
rollees for the last three years; for the ﬁrst three years positive expenditures
are as reported, but zero expenditures are simulated. For example, suppose
a person has no expenditure in year three. Based on the estimated proba-
bility that the person is still enrolled in the plan—a probability based on
the enrollment data for the last three years—the person is randomly main-
tained in the ﬁle with zero expenditure, or removed from the sample.
6.3 Summary Descriptions of Persistence
Do employees who have high expenditures in one year also have high ex-
penditures in subsequent years as well? To begin to answer this question, we
have divided plan enrollees into annual expenditure deciles. Panel A of ﬁg-
ure 6.1shows average annual expenditures in each of the years 1990 through
1995 for two groups of enrollees: those who were in the top expenditure
decile in 1990, and those who were in the top expenditure decile in 1995.
Consider the ﬁrst group: In 1990, their average expenditure was $10,295. In
the next year, their average expenditure was $4,329; two years later, in 1992,
they spent an average of $3,804; and so forth. By 1995, their average expen-
diture had fallen to $3,636. For comparison, the ﬁgure also shows the aver-
age expenditures for all enrollees over these three years, which was $1,293
in 1990 and increased 27 percent to $1,646 by 1995. Because of the overall
“inﬂation” in expenditure, it is perhaps more informative to consider ex-
penditure relative to the average, as shown in panel B of ﬁgure 6.1. Persons
in the 10th decile in 1990 spent eight times as much as the average in that
year. But six years later, in 1995, they spent just over twice the average.
Thus these data show two important regularities: Employees in the top
decile continue to have expenditures above the average over the next ﬁve
years, but there is also a substantial, almost fourfold, decline in expendi-
tures—relative to the overall average—over these six years. Rather than
considering the subsequent expenditures of employees conditional on ex-
162 Matthew J. Eichner, Mark B. McClellan, and David A. Wisependiture level in 1990, an alternative is to consider previous expenditure
conditional on expenditures in 1995. What were the prior expenditures
of employees in the top decile in 1995? Did they also have higher-than-
average expenditures in the previous ﬁve years? Yes, but whereas the ex-
penditures of employees in the top decile in 1995 were over eight times the
average in that year, ﬁve years prior to that their average expenditure was
only about two times the average, as shown in panel B of ﬁgure 6.1. Thus
the subsequent expenditure pattern of persons in the top decile in 1990 is
almost a mirror image of the prior expenditure pattern of persons who
were in the top decile in 1995.
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A
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Fig. 6.1 Expenditure for top 1990 and 1995 deciles: A, Mean annual expenditure;
B, Relative annual expenditureOn the other hand, employees with the lowest expenditures in 1990,
which are not shown, had higher expenditures in the next six years. For ex-
ample, those in the bottom three deciles, who spent nothing in 1990, had
expenditures near the average six years later in 1995. In all deciles, expen-
ditures tend to gravitate toward the mean. Only in the top decile do ex-
penditures remain substantially above the mean for six years.
Another way to view persistence is to consider the distribution of em-
ployee expenditure intervals for two diﬀerent years. Table 6.1 shows the
distribution for 1993 and 1995 for all employees. Expenditures in each year
are divided into ﬁve intervals, and three versions of the distribution are
shown. The ﬁrst panel shows the joint distributions of expenditures in the
two years. For example, 7.37 percent of employees had expenditures be-
tween $1 and $300 in both years, and 8.76 percent had expenditures be-
tween $0 and $300 in 1993 and zero expenditures in 1995 (the percentages
sum to 100 over all cells). The most important part of this panel pertains to
the fraction of employees who had high expenditures in both years. Only
about 7.4 percent had expenditures above $1,000 in both years, and only
1.44 percent had expenditures above $5,000 in both years. Thus only a very
small proportion of employees have high expenditures in one year as well
as two years later, or two years earlier.
The data also show persistence, consistent with the data in panels A and
B of ﬁgure 6.1. The second panel of table 6.2shows the distribution of 1995
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Table 6.1 Distribution of 1993 and 1995 Expenditures (%)
Expenditure Interval in 1995
Expenditure Interval in 1993 $0 $1–300 $301–1,000 $1,001–5,000  $5,000
Joint Distribution of 1993 and 1995 Expenditures
$0 32.18 6.02 2.98 2.02 1.24
$1–$300 8.76 7.37 3.76 2.53 1.30
$301–$1000 3.53 3.55 3.18 2.46 1.18
$1001–$5000 2.44 2.37 2.39 2.90 1.53
 $5000 1.27 1.09 1.02 1.49 1.44
Distribution of 1995 Expenditures Conditional on 1993 Expenditures
$0 72.41 13.54 6.70 4.55 2.80
$1–$300 36.92 31.09 15.87 10.65 5.47
$301–$1000 25.41 25.53 22.85 17.69 8.52
$1001–$5000 20.96 20.39 20.54 24.94 13.17
 $5000 20.13 17.30 16.20 23.56 22.82
Distribution of 1993 Expenditures Conditional on 1995 Expenditures
$0 66.79 29.50 22.34 17.73 18.56
$1–$300 18.18 36.14 28.25 22.17 19.36
$301–$1000 7.33 17.39 23.82 21.58 17.68
$1001–$5000 5.05 11.61 17.90 25.43 22.84
 $5000 2.64 5.36 7.69 13.09 21.56expenditures conditional on the expenditure interval in 1989. For example,
22.82 percent of persons who spent more than $5,000 in 1993 also spent
more than $5,000 in 1995, whereas only 2.80 percent of persons who had
no expenditures in 1989 spent more than $5,000 in 1991. Rather than look-
ing forward, as in the second panel, the third panel of table 6.2 looks back-
ward; it shows the distribution of 1993 expenditures conditional on the ex-
penditure interval in 1995. Although only a small proportion of employees
with expenditures above $5,000 in 1995 also had high expenditures two
years earlier in 1993, these employees are more likely to have had high ex-
penditures two years earlier than were persons who had low expenditures
in 1991. For example, 21.56 percent of employees who spent more than
$5,000 in 1995 had also spent more than $5,000 two years earlier, whereas
only 2.64 percent of employees who spent nothing in 1995 had spent more
than $5,000 two years prior.
Table 6.2 is just like table 6.1 except that it considers the distribution of
expenditures ﬁve years apart, in 1990 and 1995. Again, the key fact is that
only a very small fraction of enrollees have high expenditures in successive
years; just 1.10 percent had expenditures above $5,000 in both 1990 and
1995. Only 6.37 percent had expenditures above $1,000 in both years.
These data may at ﬁrst appear to be inconsistent with the known high
concentration of medical expenditures among a small fraction of enrollees
in any given year. In fact, they are consistent with those data. Although
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Table 6.2 Distribution of 1990 and 1995 Expenditures (%)
Expenditure Interval in 1995
Expenditure Interval in 1990 $0 $1–300 $301–1,000 $1,001–5,000  $5,000
Joint Distribution of 1993 and 1995 Expenditures
$0 21.46 7.27 4.02 3.08 1.78
$1–$300 12.22 6.99 4.09 2.95 1.62
$301–$1000 5.30 3.65 3.12 2.65 1.36
$1001–$5000 3.58 2.42 2.21 2.59 1.49
 $5000 1.86 1.10 0.90 1.19 1.10
Distribution of 1995 Expenditures Conditional on 1990 Expenditures
$0 57.05 19.33 10.69 8.19 4.74
$1–$300 43.85 25.07 14.66 10.59 5.82
$301–$1000 32.97 22.71 19.42 16.47 8.43
$1001–$5000 29.14 19.71 17.95 21.08 12.12
 $5000 30.18 17.82 14.70 19.36 17.93
Distribution of 1990 Expenditures Conditional on 1995 Expenditures
$0 48.30 33.93 28.03 24.71 24.23
$1–$300 27.51 32.61 28.50 23.68 22.08
$301–$1000 11.94 17.04 21.77 21.26 18.43
$1001–$5000 8.07 11.31 15.39 20.80 20.27
 $5000 4.18 5.11 6.30 9.55 14.99only a very small proportion of employees has high expenditures in the ﬁrst
and third years, for example, the mean expenditure among the top per-
centile is very large. Thus in any one year, about 20 percent of enrollees in
our sample account for about 90 percent of total health care costs. What
our data allow, in contrast to cross-sectional data sources, is the analysis of
individual expenditures over time. Even over a longer period of time, a
small proportion of enrollees accounts for the bulk of expenditures. But
they are not the same employees from one year to the next. Again, even
over an extended period of time only a small proportion of enrollees has
large expenditures, and thus the few that do account for a large fraction of
the cost.
6.4 A Semiparametric Model of Expenditures
We use the same basic model that we have used in our previous papers. The
goal is a formal description of medical expenditures that will allow us to
simulate the pattern of expenditures over the working life, based, in this
paper, on the expenditure observed over six years. We begin with a de-
scription of the model and its use to predict expenditures and then give. A
critical feature of the model is the extent to which it captures actual ex-
penditure patterns.
6.4.1 The Model
A useful way to think about the problem is to assume that large medical
expenditures arise as random shocks, which in practice are infrequent. But
when they do occur, they may persist for several years. Thus, there are two
critical aspects of health care expenditures that the model must capture.
One is the relationship between expenditures in successive years, the per-
sistence in expenditures. The other is the random shocks in health care ex-
penditures that are not predicted by prior expenditures or individual de-
mographic characteristics. No matter what the expenditures of employees
in prior years, there is an enormous variation in expenditures the next year.
Thus enrollees with no expenditure in one year stand some chance of hav-
ing very high expenditure in the next year. Likewise, enrollees with very
high expenditures in one year stand a good chance of having very low ex-
penditures in the next year. Indeed, the lifetime distribution of expendi-
tures is determined much more by these random shocks than by persistent
expenditures that are predictable based on prior expenditures or demo-
graphic characteristics.
Because a large fraction of employees have no expenditures in a given
year, it is useful to consider explicitly the expected value of expenditures in
year tMt, given by
(1) E(Mt)   Pr[Mt   0]   0   Pr[Mt   0]   E(MtMt   0)
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E(MtMt   0)—separately. The probability of nonzero expenditures is es-
timated using a linear probability speciﬁcation, and the level of expendi-
tures given that expenditures are positive is estimated using a log-linear re-
gression. In both cases, the estimated relationship is of the form
(2) Mt      D    Mlag   ε,
where medical expenditures in year t, Mt, are predicted by three factors:
(a)demographic characteristics, denoted by D, and which include age, sex,
and employment status (hourly or salaried); (b) past health care expendi-
tures Mlag which include expenditures in years t – 1, t – 2, . . . , t – 5; and
(c) random shocks, ε.
The critical part of our analysis is the use of the resulting estimates to pre-
dict future expenditures. The ﬁt of these predictions depends not only on
our ability to model expected expenditures given an individual’s character-
istics, but also on the distribution of shocks to expenditures. We want the
distribution that is used in prediction to match the actual distribution as
closely as possible, and this distribution is extremely skewed within any
given cell of expenditures. We model this critical “error” component non-
parametrically: Instead of assuming a particular distribution for the ran-
dom shocks ε, we use the actual distribution of expenditure errors, given de-
mographic characteristics and past expenditures. For example, consider the
prediction of expenditures in the third year, given expenditures in the prior
two years. The sample is divided into groups determined by age, sex, and em-
ployee status (hourly or salaried). Then, within each of these groups the
sample is further divided into expenditure groups deﬁned by expenditures
in prior years. Now the prediction of expenditure in year six, for example,
has two parts. First, the parameters estimated in equation (2) are used to
predict mean expenditures in year six. This “systematic” part would show,
for example, that enrollees with high expenditures in year one tended on av-
erage to have much lower expenditures ﬁve years later, as revealed in ﬁgure
6.1. Second, a random shock is added to this systematic component. Within
each cell, the random component is selected randomly from the actual dis-
tribution of residuals within that cell. Suppose that the prediction is for en-
rollees who had high expenditures in years one through ﬁve. This method as-
sures that if a given proportion of persons in this high-expenditure cell have
high expenditures in the sixth year, then our predictions will also show this
same proportion (on average) to have high expenditures in the sixth year.
Thus, the method captures not only the average relationship between ex-
penditures over time, but if high expenditures persist for some proportion
of persons with a given set of demographic and past expenditure charac-
teristics, then the model will also capture the proportion with high persist-
ence. Predictions for years beyond six are obtained by repeated applica-
tions of this procedure.
Individual Expenditures and Medical Saving Accounts 167The predictions based on the analysis here should be more accurate than
those presented in our previous papers, for two reasons: One is the longer
panel and the other is that we take account of the departure of enrollees
from the ﬁrm. There remains an additional limitation that even this longer
panel may not capture. Suppose that expenditure twenty years hence is re-
lated to current expenditure. A six-year panel cannot capture the eﬀect of
any such long lag eﬀects. We could augment our model with information
from other sources on the relationship between medical care use over very
long time periods. For example, are heart problems at age ﬁfty preceded by
high health care expenditures at age thirty? No available panel of medical
claims information can be used to determine directly whether such a rela-
tionship exists. However, we can observe expenditures in the next ﬁve years
of persons who had high expenditures at age thirty, as in the descriptive sta-
tistics in table 6.2, for example. Additionally, going to older ages and look-
ing backwards, we can observe the expenditures in the previous ﬁve years
of persons who had high expenditures at age ﬁfty. Both of these approaches
suggest that, for the most part, very high expenditures do not persist. Thus
we believe that our predictions provide a good approximation to the distri-
butions that would be observed in very long panels. We do not show pa-
rameter estimates in this paper, but parameter estimates based on the
three-year panel are discussed in Eichner, McClellan, and Wise (1998).
6.4.2 Fit
In our previous work (Eichner, McClellan, and Wise 1998), we gave con-
siderable attention to the ﬁt of the model and found that the speciﬁcation
ﬁt the data very well. In particular, the simulated distribution of expendi-
tures at various ages matched the actual distributions very closely. Here we
present only a few indicators of ﬁt. Because predicting nonzero expendi-
ture is an important component of prediction, we show estimates of the
predicted proportion of enrollees with positive expenditure, conditional
on demographic characteristics and expenditures in the prior two periods.
Table 6.3 shows the actual and predicted percent with positive expendi-
tures in 1995, conditional on expenditures in 1993 (t–2) and 1994 (t–1). The
data are grouped by expenditure interval in the prior two periods. The sim-
ulated and actual percents are very close.
Figure 6.2 shows projections three years ahead, based on the prior three
years of data, compared to actual data. The projections are by age, gender,
and employee group. For example, data for persons when they were aged
twenty-ﬁve, twenty-six, and twenty-seven are used to predict the propor-
tion with positive expenditures at age thirty. The match between simulated
and actual proportions is quite close.
Finally, ﬁgure 6.3 shows simulated proportions with positive expendi-
tures over a “working life.” These simulated proportions are determined as
follows: Begin with a sample of 1,000 employees age twenty-ﬁve, for each
168 Matthew J. Eichner, Mark B. McClellan, and David A. WiseTable 6.3 Actual Versus Simulated 1995 Expenditures, Conditional on
Expenditures in 1993 and 1994 (%)
1993 Expenditure
1994 Expenditure $0 $0–300 $300–1,000 $1,000–5,000 $5,000+
$0
Actual 22.94 42.50 45.22 48.29 44.47
Simulated 22.75 41.84 48.28 46.38 47.11
$0–$300
Actual 51.32 66.62 69.85 71.77 69.16
Simulated 50.25 68.10 70.62 71.37 69.39
$300–$1000
Actual 55.79 73.35 79.49 79.97 81.14
Simulated 56.68 74.93 78.26 78.72 78.00
$1000–$5000
Actual 61.73 74.63 83.73 85.51 84.63
Simulated 60.27 72.27 83.05 85.69 83.75
$5000+
Actual 66.03 74.88 76.70 85.57 90.00
Simulated 62.82 77.65 77.67 85.74 90.19
Fig. 6.2 Three-year-ahead projections, by age, gender, and employee groupgender and employee group. Then apply equations (1) and (2) repeatedly,
producing a stream of expenditures for each person through age ﬁfty-ﬁve.
The simulated proportions at a given age are the proportion of enrollees
simulated to have positive expenditures. The actual proportions are the ac-
tual proportions of enrollees at a given age with positive expenditures. Al-
though the match for salaried men and women is quite close, for salaried
enrollees the simulated proportions are somewhat lower than the actual
proportions—thus exaggerating to some extent the proportions of en-
rollees for zero expenditures. Overall, though, we conclude that simulated
expenditures compare closely with actual expenditure patterns.
The descriptive data above suggest that persistence is not as prevalent as
might be thought. We would like to know, however, how the MSA accu-
mulations of plan enrollees over a working life would vary among en-
rollees. Would a large number spend all contributions for medical expen-
ditures, while others spent little or nothing? Or would the distribution of
MSA balances tend to be much less extreme?
To answer this question, we have simulated lifetime expenditures. The
simulations are based on a model of individual expenditures over time,
which in turn is based on the pattern of expenditures over the six years of
observed data. Here, we explain only the key features of the model. A use-
ful way to think about expenditures is to assume that large medical expen-
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Fig. 6.3 Projections of positive expenditures over a working life of salaried men,
salaried women, hourly men, and hourly womenditures arise as random shocks, which in practice are infrequent. But when
they do occur, they may persist for several years. Thus, there are two criti-
cal aspects of health care expenditures that the model must capture. One is
the relationship between expenditures in successive years, the persistence
in expenditures. The other is the random shocks in health care expendi-
tures that are not predicted by prior expenditures or by demographic vari-
ables. No matter what the expenditures of employees in prior years, there
is an enormous variation in expenditures the next year. Thus enrollees with
no expenditure in one year stand some chance of having very high expen-
diture in the next year. Likewise, enrollees with very high expenditures in
one year stand a good chance of having very low expenditures in the next
year. Indeed, the lifetime distribution of expenditures is determined much
more by these random shocks than by persistent expenditures that are pre-
dictable based on prior expenditures or demographic characteristics. Ex-
tensive evaluation of actual versus predicted medical spending shows that
the model predicts actual expenditure patterns quite well.5Importantly, the
method captures not only the average relationship between expenditures
over time, but if high expenditures persist for some proportion of persons
with a given set of demographic and past expenditure characteristics, then
the model also captures the proportion with high persistence.
Using the model, we have simulated the lifetime expenditures of 1,000
employees who begin work at age twenty-ﬁve and retire at sixty. To predict
expenditures at age twenty-six, for example, we consider age, sex, employee
group, and any expenditures over the prior six years. To predict for age
twenty-seven, we use age twenty-six predicted expenditures plus the earlier
ﬁve years of actual expenditures, and so forth. We realize that few, if any
persons, would work for the same ﬁrm over an entire working life, but it is
the expenditure pattern that we want to capture, assuming that employees
continue to use a similar MSA plan.
The cumulative distribution of (i.e., the common logarithm of) lifetime
expenditures for men and for women through age sixty is shown in ﬁgure
6.4. Translating to dollars, over a working lifetime, expenditures of both
men and women vary from about $10,000 (about 10 percent of employees)
to over $100,000 (about 10 percent of employees). The median is about
$32,000.
Given the distribution of expenditures, how might an MSA plan work?
We consider this plan:
• The employer puts $2,000 in each employee’s MSA at the beginning of
each year.6 For illustration, we assume that MSA assets are invested
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5. For details of the model and tests of predictive validity see Eichner, McClellan, and Wise
(1997, 1998).
6. We assume that employees do not withdraw from their MSA balances for other purposes
or contribute less than the full $2,000 in each year. This allows us to focus on the maximum










































0either in a bond fund or in a Standard & Poor’s 500 index (S&P 500)
market index fund. The real return on the bond fund is assumed to be
equal to 2.5 percent, the average real return on high-grade long-term
corporate bonds between 1926 and 1995, and the return on the market
index fund equal to 7.7 percent, the average real return on large com-
pany stocks between 1926 and 1995 (see Ibbotson Associates 1998).
• The health insurance plan has a $4,000 annual deductible, with ex-
penses below the deductible paid by the employee (out of the MSA)
and 100 percent of expenditures above the deductible covered by the
health insurance plan. If the MSA balance goes to zero, all expenses
are paid by the insurance plan.
By assuming a real rate of return in the MSA we are in eﬀect assuming that
health care costs increase at the same rate as the consumer price index.
Sensitivity analysis could of course be conducted for any number of other
assumptions.
Under these assumptions, the distribution of MSA balances at age sixty
are shown in panels A and B of ﬁgure 6.5. After a working lifetime, most
employees are left with a substantial accumulation. With investment in
stocks, the median balance for men is about $250,000. About 90 percent of
the salaried men have a balance at age sixty that exceeds $150,000. For
women, the median is somewhat less than $250,000. About 90 percent of
women have balances that exceed $100,000. The balance with bond invest-
ment is much smaller: the median for both men is somewhat over and for
women somewhat less than $100,000.
Perhaps an easier way to understand the plan implications is to consider
the ending balance in the MSA relative to the sum of the $2,000 annual
contributions to the MSA. The distribution of this ratio at age sixty is
shown in panels A and B of ﬁgure 6.6. At retirement, the median balance
for men with investment in stocks is about 350 percent of total contribu-
tions to the MSA; the median balance for women is about 325 percent of
contributions. For only 10 percent of men is the balance less than 200 per-
cent of contributions; for only 10 percent of women the balance is less than
about 125 percent of total contributions. For 10 percent of men the bal-
ance is greater than about 450 percent of contributions, and for 10 percent
of women the balance is over 450 percent of contributions.
It is clear that the typical employee would accumulate substantial bal-
ances in an MSA such as the one illustrated here.7 Thus, with no counter-
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7. The accumulation is, in fact, underestimated a bit. For technical reasons, simulated ex-
penditures as a person ages are predicted two years at a time, assuming that the employee
would pay all expenditures up to $8,000 over the two-year period, rather than up to $4,000 in
any single year. This exaggerates a bit the actual employee expenditure under our plan. In ad-
dition, the investment return is assumed to apply to the balance remaining at the end of each
two-year period—(balance)(1  r)(1  r)—which produces lower accumulation than a return

































































































































































)balancing changes, the typical employee would see a substantial increase
in assets at retirement. It is also clear that the accumulation depends criti-
cally on the level of annual contributions to the MSA.
6.5 Summary and Further Discussion
Low household saving in the United States essentially makes cata-
strophic health insurance plans infeasible, since most households would
ﬁnd it diﬃcult to pay even modestly large medical expenditures. MSAs are
a way to accumulate a fund from which medical expenses could be paid un-
der a catastrophic health insurance plan, thus—over a broad range of
treatment—making individuals responsible for determining whether the
beneﬁt of the treatment is worth the price of care. But there is an additional
potential obstacle to such an arrangement. If some persons have consis-
tently high medical expenditures whereas others have consistently low ex-
penditure, an MSA plan would essentially be self-insurance for the former
and a tax-free saving account for the latter group. Thus we have considered
whether the pattern of individual medical expenditures over time would
present an important limit on the feasibility of MSAs. We ﬁnd that al-
though there is some persistence, the prospect of participants with consis-
tently high medical expenditures is rare. This work follows our prior work
in this area but relies on a longer panel data ﬁle than was available before
and uses a data ﬁle that allows persons with zero expenditures to be distin-
guished from those who may have left the ﬁrm.
Under the illustrative plan we have simulated, most employees would ap-
proach retirement with a substantial proportion of MSA contributions re-
maining in the account. Only a small fraction would approach retirement
with very small balances. Based on the illustrative plan we simulated, if in-
vestment of MSA assets were in equities, more than 50 percent of employ-
ees would have MSA balances greater than 300 percent of lifetime contri-
butions to the MSA. Only about 10 percent of men would retain less than
200 percent of contributions and only about 10 percent of women would
retain less than 125 percent of contributions. If investment were in bonds,
balances would be much lower. In this case about 10 percent of both men
and women would retain less than 50 percent of contributions. Thus we be-
lieve that persistence of medical expenditures does not present an overrid-
ing obstacle to the adaption of MSA plans.
The simulations do not incorporate any behavioral response and thus
consider neither the reduction in medical expenditures that would likely re-
sult from such a plan, nor the ensuing reduction in medical insurance pre-
miums that such a plan would allow. It is reasonable to assume that expen-
ditures below the $4,000 deductible would be reduced. According to price
elasticity estimates obtained by Eichner (1997), which are based on anal-
ysis of price response in another Fortune 500 ﬁrm, expenditure below the
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cost treatments account for a large fraction of medical expenditures, the
reduction in total cost would depend importantly on the size of the cata-
strophic insurance deductible.
It might well be, of course, that expenditures above the deductible would
also be aﬀected.
Such a plan would also add to individual “risk,” increasing the variance
in expected individual lifetime medical expenditures. The increased vari-
ance, however, must be evaluated in the context of increased saving, which
would likely result from the MSA. Essentially all participants would accu-
mulate more retirement assets than they otherwise would have. The risk is
that the amount of the addition to saving is uncertain: Some would accu-
mulate more than others.8
Plans like our illustrative MSA arrangement could have substantial im-
plications for the composition of employee compensation, and possibly for
the total level as well. A $2,000 MSA contribution when combined with any
realistic reduced health insurance premium would still “cost” more than the
current health plan. However, “forced savings” is perhaps a better charac-
terization than “increased cost.” Rough estimates suggest that the overall
cost of the current ﬁrm plan is about $1,400 per participant (including
spouses and children). With no behavioral eﬀects, the MSA plan would re-
duce ﬁrm insurance costs by half, to about $700. With an MSA contribu-
tion of $2,000 and no reduction in other beneﬁts, the net increase in the ben-
eﬁt portion of employee compensation due to the IHA package is $1,300.
Employee health care expenditures are increased by about $700 because the
decrease in the ﬁrm’s insurance cost is due to the employee payments from
the MSA balances. Thus, net beneﬁts are increased by about $1,300.
We have not considered the tax implications of an MSA plan. The actual
additional cost that must be divided between the ﬁrm and its employees
may be substantially lessened by the favorable tax treatment accorded con-
tributions to 401(k) and similar accounts. Nor have we considered the fea-
sibility of combining it with a retirement plan such as a 401(k). (Many
401[k] plans were established with no apparent reduction in other pension
beneﬁts.9) Now, both the insurance premium and the MSA contribution,
if it were treated like a retirement saving plan, would be tax deductible. In
contrast, employee out-of-pocket health care expenses at present would
typically not be tax deductible. Nor have we considered here the important
adverse-selection problems that plague all health care systems with choice
among a menu of plans. These issues remain to be explored.
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8. We show the simulated distribution of asset accumulation. We do this to illustrate the
risk of low (or high) accumulation. We do not assign a given utility function to the distribu-
tions. A small chance of a small accumulation could have a substantial aﬀect on the overall
utility attached to a distribution of outcomes.
9. See Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1996, 1998), for example.In addition, small changes in the structure of the plan, can change sub-
stantially the way the numbers look. For example, if the MSA contribution
is made at the end of the year—and thus is not available to fund expendi-
tures in that year—accumulated MSA balances at retirement would be
larger. The results would also look quite diﬀerent if the MSA contribution
were $1,000, say, instead of $2,000. This sensitivity suggests that a contri-
bution could be set so that, taking into account the tax implication, for ex-
ample, the MSA package would not increase health care costs.
Private retirement saving is now dominated by personal retirement sav-
ing—401(k)s and IRAs—and current trends suggest even greater reliance
on personal retirement accounts in the future, as shown by Poterba, Venti,
and Wise (2000). In particular, 401(k) plans established by employers are
likely to expand further. Such plans place greater reliance on individual
choice, perhaps engender greater self-reliance, and will almost surely lead
to substantial increases in household assets at retirement. The market risk
associated with such plans may also increase the risk faced by individuals,
but, like the MSA risk, such risk must also be evaluated in the light of much
greater accumulation of retirement assets. Many current proposals for So-
cial Security reform also suggest the establishment of individual accounts,
which place further choice in the hands of individuals and would also likely
increase individual and national saving. The “medical saving account”
portion of the MSA would likely have a similar eﬀect. And it is natural to
consider MSAs combined with 401(k) plans. In addition, the MSA holds
the prospect of providing medical care more eﬃciently and reducing med-
ical care expenditures. It does this by relying on individuals to decide
whether the care they receive is worth the price they pay for it.
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